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[L. A. No. 23005. In Bank. Jan. 16, 1958.]

J. S. GARMON et ai., Respondents, v. SAN DIEGO BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Injunctive Belief-J'urisdiction of State Oourts.-In
labor disputes involving business enterprises engaged in interstate commerce, the power to grant equitable relief by way of
injunction is beyond the jurisdiction of state courts; Congress
has occupied the field and, though the federal agency set up
to adjust a controversy failed to act beoause the interstate
business involved did not amount to the minimum sum set up
by such agency, the state courts have DO power to do so, the
function of filling the gap, insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, being legislative, notjudioial.
[2] Id.-Remedies-J'urisdictioD.-8tate courts are not foreclosed
from asserting jurisdiction in an action for damages resulting
from the tortious conduct of those engaged in a labor dispute
[1J See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 145 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 320
et seq.
MeR. Dig. References: [1J Labor, § 25; [2, 4, 10] J.abor, § 24;
[3J Torts, § 2; [5] Labor, § 20a; [6J Labor, § 21; [7] Labor,
§§ 20a, 21; [8, 9} Labor, § 23.
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with an employer eugaged in interstate commerce, at least in
the absence of a conflict between state and federal policies and
procedural remedies that would result in interference witb uniform enforcement of federal law_
[3] 'l'orts-DeflnitioD aDd Nature.-Under Civ. Code, 11708, imposing on everyone tbe duty lito abstain from· injuring the perBon or property of another, or infringing upon any of his
rights," there is a breach of such legal duty when one who
performs an act not authorized by law infringes on a right
another is entitled to enjoy or causes a substantial material
loss to another j that breach cODstitutes the eommission of •
tort for which an action in damages will lie.
[4] Labor-Remedies-ActioD for Damages.-AD employer who is
damaged by an unlawful and unauthorized labor practice may
recover damages in a tort action.
[6a.6b] Id.-UDions-EcoDomic Pressure ActiTities.-Conduct of
labor unioDs resulting in a demand OD plaintiffs that they
execute a eontract which, if executed, would constitute an
unlawful interference with the bargaining rights of plaintiffs'
employees was directly contrary to the policy of the state as
8et forth in Lab. Code, I 923, relating to the freedom of employees to organize, and constituted an unlawful labor practice.
[S] Id. - Strikes - Jurisdictional Strikes.-If employees, preferring to deal directly with their employers pursuant to their
individual bargaining rights, had exercised their rights and
chosen to deal with their employers through some committee
or organization with regard to the concerted activities of a
labor union demanding that the employers enter into an agreement requiring all their employees to become members of the
union, they would come directly within the provisions of the
Jurisdictional Strike Act. (Lab. Code, I§ 1115-1120.)
['1] Id.-UDions-BcoDomic Pressure Activities: Strikes-Jurisdictiona} Strikes.-Lab. Code, §§ 923 (relating to public policy
as to labor organizations), 1115-1118 (jurisdictional strikes), ,
are "' pari materia in that they relate to the same general
8ubject and should be considered together; they represent an
endeavor on the part of the Legislature to safeguard the
rights of the individual workman and the employer in the
field of labor-management relationships.
[8] Id.-Picketing.-Peaceful picketing is identified with freedom
of speech as a means by which pickets communicate to others
the existence of a labor controversy, but this does Dot free
picketing from all restraint.
[9] Id.-PicketiDg.":":There may be something more in peaceful
picketing than free speech, depending on the facts of the case,
[3] See Oal.Jur., Torts, 51; Am.Jur., Torts, 52 et seq.
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and conduct in exercise of the asserted right is subject to regulation in accordance with a valid state policy in cases where
interstate commerce is not involved.
[10] Id. - Remedies - Jurisdiction.-In an action against unions
to enjoin picketing and recover damages, the superior court
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as to both issues,
'and the fact that equitable relief was ultimately denied did
not destroy the judgment as to the award of damages, though
the award was below the jurisdictional amount otherwise
necessary.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover
damages. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed insofar as it
awarded injunctive relief, and affirmed insofar as it awarded
damages.
Todd & Todd, Thomas Whelan, John T. Holt, Clarence E.
Todd, Walter Wencke, Charles P. Scully, John C. Stevenson,
Mathew Tobriner and Charles K. Hackler for Appellants.
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W.
Waddell, Jr. for Respondents.
SHENK, J .-This case is here for the second time. The
first was on appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in
and for the County of San Diego ordering an injunction to
prevent continuing conduct of the defendants found by the
court to have been the cause of irreparable damage to the
property and rights of the plaintiffs, and awarding $1,000
damages resulting from alleged past tortious activities of the
defendants. The judgment was affirmed by this court on
December 2, 1955. (Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Oouncil, 45 Ca1.2d 657 [291 P.2d 1].) On certiorari the
Supreme Court of the United States ordered that the judgment of this court be .. vacated" and the cause be remanded
"for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion and thE'
opinions in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra [353
U.S. 1 (77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601)], and Ama.lgamated Meal
Outters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., supra [353 U.S 20 (77 S.Ct.
604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613)]." (Sail Dic!1o Buildin[J Trades Council
v. J. 8. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 [77 S.Ct. 607. 1 L.Ed.2d 618].)
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Both the Guss case (Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,
353 U.S. 1 [77 8.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601]) and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case (Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 [77S. Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613]) were
decided concurrently with the present case, March 25, 1957.
They involved the exercise of jurisdiction by state agencies
over labor disputes which substantially affected interstate
commerce within the cognizance of the National Labor Relations Act. In the Guss case the Supreme Court held that
the Utah Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction to resolve
a charge of unfair labor practice against an employer when
the National Labor Relations Board had refused jurisdiction
on the ground that the employer's operations were "predominately local in character." The court stated at page
602 that "the proviso to § 10(a) [formal cession of power
to state agencies] is the exclusive means whereby States may
be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has
entrusted to the National Labor Relations Board." In the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters case the Ohio court of Common
Pleas asserted jurisdiction in a labor dispute, and the Supreme
Court stated at page 606 that "If the proviso to § 10(a) ...
operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes within
the National Board's jurisdiction in the absence of a cession
agreement, it must also exclude state courts." In order that
the present disposition of this case conform to the decision and
order of the Supreme Court it is obvious that the judgment
of the trial court herein, insofar as injunctive relief is concerned, must be reversed. In doing 80 it is deemed desirable
if not necessary to review to some considerable extent what
has taken place in the present proceeding.
As to the facts it appears that the plaintiffs are partners
engaged in interstate commerce as retail dealers in lumber
and other building materials; that their employees are not
members of a labor union and had indicated that they do
not desire to join, or to be represented by, a union; that
the defendant unions had not been recognized by the plaintiffs
nor certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the
representatives of the plaintiffs' employees; that nevertheless
the defendants demanded that the plaintiffs enter into an
agreement which would require that all of the plaintiffs I
employees be or become members of the defendant unions;
that upon the plaintiffs' refusal to enter into such an agreement, on the ground that to do so would violate the law, the
defendants placed pickets at the plaintiffs' place of business,
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had the plaintiffs' trucks followed, threatened persons about
to enter the plaintiffs' place of business with economic interference and injury, and that by such eonduct they induced
building eontractors to discontinue their patronage.
The plaintiffs filed a petition with the National Labor
Relations Board requesting that the question of its employee
representation be resolved. The board refused to take jurisdiction. The refusal was based on the board's declared policy
that the annual dollar amount of the plaintiffs' interstate
business must but did not exceed a minimum set by the board.
The present proceeding was commenced in the superior eourt
for an injunction to prevent further alleged tortious eonduct
on the part of the defendants and for damages. The court
found on substantial evidence that the intent of the defendants was not to induce the employees to join one of their
unions, nor to provide education or information as to the
benefits of organized representation; that their only purpose
was to compel the plaintiffs to execute the agreement or to
suffer the destruction of their business. The eourt enjoined
the unions ". . . from picketing the places of business of
plaintiffs, from following the tru('ks of the plaintiffs, from preventing or attempting to prevent, by means of threats, expressed or implied, persons having business with the plaintiffs
from entering the premises of the plaintiffs, from inducing or
attempting to induce by such means potential eustomers of
plaintiffs to refuse to purchase from plaintiffs or to refuse
to accept delivery of goods from plaintiffs or in plaintiffs'
trucks, and from doing any other acts tending or intended to
injure plaintiffs' business. . . ." The court also found that
the plaintiffs' business had been damaged to the extent of
$1,000 by the defendants' conduct and as stated, rendered
judgment for that amount.
In affirming the judgment this court held that the National
Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction to prevent unfair
labor practices against employers engaged in interstate commerce; that the conduct on the part of the unions constituted
unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Labor
Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C., § 158) ; that in vesting
in the National Labor Relations Board the discretion to accept
or refuse jurisdiction of a controversy under section 10 of
the act Congress must have intended that state courts should
be free to act where the board had specifically determined, by
refusing to accept jurisdiction, that the controversy did not
have a pronounced impact on interstate eommerce; that aI-
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though section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act made pro-'
vision for the National Labor Relations Board to cede, by
agreement, jurisdiction to state agencies where the state law
is not inconsistent with the national labor policy, Congress
had not, by implication or otherwise, prohibited the state
from assuming jurisdiction in the absence of such a cession
and where the National Labor Relations Board had refused
to take jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to
injunctive relief and to the damages awarded by the state
court.
In arriving at the foregoing conclusions this court took into
consideration the fact appearing in the record that in the
administration of the National Labor Relations Act the board
bad established certain standards as prerequisites to its assumption of jurisdiction. One essential was, of course, that
the business of the enterprise must atiect interstate commerce
in a substantial way. But even when so atiected the board's
announced policy, for budgetary or other reasons, caused it
to refuse jurisdiction in certain cases. This policy was
declared by the board in its public announcement of October
6, 1950, that in order ". . • to better effectuate the purpose
of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases
[the Board] has decided not to exercise its jurisdiction to
the fullest extent possible under the Authority delegated to
it by Congress, but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose
operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a
pronounced impact upon the interstate flow of commerce
wherever federal jurisdiction exists under the statute and
the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. . . ."
Among the enterprises excluded were those which did not
have a "direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a year"
or an "indirect inflow of material valued at $1,000,000 a
year." (26 Labor Relations R~ference Manual 50.)
The foregoing requirements were not altered by the board
in a 1954 revision of its standards (34 Labor Relations Reference Manual 75) and were in force at the time of filing the
plaintiffs' complaint. Pursuant to the standards set by those
rules the remedy sought by the plaintiffs was excluded from
consideration by the board for the reason that only $250,000 of
the plaintiffs' required business during the preceding year
was in interstate ..commerce. The plaintiffs were thus denied
any redress before the board and were so notified. When the
plaintiffs filed their petition with the board they received a
reply stating: "The amount of business by Valley Lumber
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Company [the plaintiffs' business title] in interstate commerce is insufficient for the Board to assert jurisdiction on
the basis of present Board decisions." Later on, after investigation by the regional director of the board, the plaintiffs
were notified that their petition had been dismissed with the
statement that" in view of the scope of the business operation
involved, it would not effectuate the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act to institute further proceedings at this
time.... "
[1] The present situation of the plaintiffs therefore appears to be about this: Being in a business affecting interstate
commerce their remedy by way of injunction is relegated to
federal law and relief. Because their business in that category
does not amount to $500,000 per annum they are caught in the
vacuum. No federal judicial relief can be granted and in this
"no man's land" no equitable relief can be granted by a
state court. This unfortunate state of the law is recognized
by the Supreme Court in both the majority and dissenting
opinion in the Guss case. It is variously referred to as a
"vacuum" or "twilight zone" or a "no man's land" in the
law on account of which parties engaged in interstate commerce in a substantial amount but below the standards established by the board may not obtain equitable relief in state
courts or other relief from the National Labor Relations
Board however disastrously the alleged tortious conduct of the
defendants may affect the plaintiffs' business.
We are, therefore, bound to conclude from the decisions
of the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs are without equitable
relief under federal law because Congress has occupied the
field and, although the federal agency set up to adjust the
controversy has failed to act, the state courts have no power
to do so. In this connection the Supreme Court declared
in the Guss case that the function of filling the gap, insofar
as injunctive relief is concerned, is not judicial but legislative
and must be performed by congressional enactment.
Whether the national board has the power to disclaim jurisdiction by a declaration of its policy appears not to have
been judicially determined. The question was referred to in
the Guss case by quoting from Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 at page 776
[67 s.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234] as follows: "The election of
the National Board to'decline jurisdiction in certain types of
cases, for budgetary or other reasons presents a different
problem which we do not now decide."

)
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We turn now to the question of damages awarded by the' ~
trial court. In remanding the present case the Supreme Court '
stated: "Respondents, however, argue that the award of
damages must be sustained under United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 s.Ot.
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025J. We do not reach this question. The
California Supreme Court leaves us in doubt, but its opinion
indicates that it felt bound to 'apply' or in some sense follow
federal law in this case. There is, of course, no such compUlsion. Laburnum sustained an award of damages under
state tort law for violent conduct. We cannot know that
the California court would have interpreted its own state law
to allow an award of damages in this different situation." The
"different situation" referred to would seem to pose the
question: Would this court interpret the California law to
authorize an action for damages for the alleged unlawful
tortious conduct of the defendants in the absence of violence'
This question calls for an examination of the approach to the
problem resulting in our former decision. From that examination it may be said that both the state and federal laws
were relied on as establishing actionable conduct. Any distinction as between those laws was not thoroughly explored.
It now appears that any reliance on federal law to justify
the award for damages is not tenable under the facts of
this case and we should now proceed to determine whether
the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for damages on
account of the alleged past activities on the part of the
defendants under state law.
[2] It is apparent from the announcements of the Supreme
Court as to the limitations on the jurisdiction of a state court
to grant equitable relief in the solution of labor disputes that
such courts are not foreclosed from asserting jurisdiction in
an action for damages resulting from the tortious conduct of
those engaged in the dispute. If the court had concluded that
jurisdiction to award damages had been preempted by congressional legislation undoubtedly a declaration to that effect
would have been forthcoming. In determining the jurisdiction
intended by Congress to vest in the National Labor Relations
Board the Supreme Court stated in Garne,. v. Teamsters etc.
Union, 346 U.s. 485, at page 488 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 2281 :
"The National Labor Management Relations Act, as we have
before pointed out, leaves much to the states, thOltgh Congress
has refrained from telling us how much." In view of the
decisions of the Supreme Court holding that state agencies

Jan. 1958]
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and courts lack the jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief
under any circumstances in interstate commerce eases, there
would seem to be nothing left to the states if their courts are
also prohibited from making an award for damages in a proper
case.
In those cases where the Supreme Court has held that exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the National Labor Relations
Board it appears without question that the basis of the decisions is the desirability of avoiding such a confict between
state and federal policies and procedural remedies as would
result in an interference with uniform enforcement of the
federal act. In Garnerv. Teamsters etc. Union, supra, 346
U.S. 485, the court held at page 490 that Congress considered
that centralization was necessary "to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities
and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures. . . ." The Garner case involved injunctive relief
only. In the Laburnum case (United Oonstruction Worker' v.
Laburnum Oonstruction Oorp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 838,
98 L.Ed. 10251) the action was one for compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of unfair labor practices amounting to tortious conduct. As to the nature of the conduct
there involved it appeared that agents of the labor unions
"threatened and intimidated respondent's officers and employees with violence to such a degree that respondent was
compelled to abandon all its projects in that area." After
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a modified
judgment for damages the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari limited to the following question: ". . .
does the National Labor Relations Board have exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude the
State Court from hearing and determining the issues in a
common-law tort action ba.c;ed upon this conducU" The
petitioners contended in reliance on the Garner case that the
federal government occupi~d" the field so completely that
state courts were "excluded not only from enjoining future
unfair labor practices ... but that state court.'! are exc1uded
also from entertaining common-law tort actions for the
recovery of damages caused by such conduct." The Supreme
Court rejected this "argument and distinguished the Garner
case on the ground that the federal legislation was not applicable to damages for tortious conduct and that no interference
with national policy could arise. The court stated: "In the
Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative

...
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remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted.
Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting
damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For US to
cut off t.he injured respondent from this right of recovery
will deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from
liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial
reason for reaching such a result. The contrary view is
consistent with the language of the Act and there is positive
support for it in our decisions and in the legislative history
of the Act." The court then further commented on its
decision in the Garner case as follows: ., To the extent that
Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor
practices, that case recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however,
that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with
the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there
is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties
or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. The'
care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing
conflict between state and federal administrative remedies
in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had
existed, the state procedure would have survived. The primarily private nature of claims for damages under state
law also distinguishes them in a measure from the public
nature of the regulation of future labor relations under
federal law."
It is significant that the basis for the decision in the
Laburnum case is that the remedy in damages for tortious
conduct there involved did not conflict with federal legislation. It would seem necessarily to follow that the same
conclusion would be reached in the case of an action for
damages for any other tortious conduct which did not so
conflict. The fact that the particular tort in the Laburnum
case was said to be a common-law tort, or one involving physical violence, is, of itself, not controlling. To confine the
Laburnum case to its own facts would be to completely ignore
the rationale of the decision. It would require also that we
ignore the language 'by which the present case was remanded
for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, after stating that
"Laburnum was an award of damages under state tort law
for violent conduct," then invited this court to examine its

)
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state law to determine whether a cause of action for damages
in tort could be maintained under that law in a situation which
the Supreme Court referred to as "different." Certainly we
cannot now refuse to apply our law merely because of the
suggested difference. Again, if it had been the intent of
the Supreme Court to limit jurisdiction to torts of violence an
order of reversal and not an order of remand would also seem
to have been appropriate as the record which that court had
before it was devoid of any evidence of physical violence on
the part of the defendants.
In considering the effect of the Laburnum case we are not
alone in concluding that it is not to be confined to picketing
accompanied by acts of violence. Following that decision a
number of federal and state courts have affirmed judgments
for damages in cases of tortious conduct differing from that
in the Laburnum case but well within the rationale of that
case. Most significant are those cases wherein, like the present
one, only peaceful picketing was involved. In Denver etc.
Counc~i v. Shore, 132 Colo. 187 [287 P.2d 267], it was claimed
that the Laburnum case was distinguishable on the ground that
violence was there involved. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that this "is scarcely a proper basis for distinction as it
goes not to the principle involved, but only to the enent of
damage that might be properly determinable. Admitting
that in the Laburnum case the tort was excessive and that
in the present case it was mild and devoid of any rowdyism,
nevertheless, in either case a recovery in damages for injury
done on account of the illegal practice is necessarily upon the
basis of tort." (See also Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo,
S. A., 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709]; Dallas
General Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., of Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.)
281 S.W.2d 738, 745; Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540 [109
A.2d 300, 301] ; International Sound Technicians v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal.App.2d 23 [296 P.2d 395] ; Selchow & Righter
Co. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874.)
In accordance with the views expressed by the Supreme
Court in the Laburnum case, and the court's reference thereto
in remanding the present case, the question next for consideration is whether the alleged conduct of the defendants was
unlawful under the laws of this state and an actionable tort
within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the purpose of the
defendants' picketing was unlawful under the state law the
case cannot be distinguished from the Laburnum case and
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the other state and federal eases to the same effect as to
the jurisdictional issue.
[S] The law of this state imposes upon everyone the duty
"to abstain from injuring the person or property of another,
or infringing upon any of his rights." (Civ. Code, § 1708.)
There is a breach of such legal duty when one who performs
an act not authorized by law infringes upon a right another
is entitled to enjoy, or causes a substantial material loss to
another. That breach constitutes the commission of a tort,
under the laws of this state, for which an action in damages
will lie. In Loup v. Califorftia 8. B. B. Co., 63 Cal. 97, it was
said at page 99: " A person commits a tort, and renders himself liable to an action for damages, who commits some act not
authorized by law, or who omits to do something which he
ought to do by law, and by such an act or omission either
infringes some absolute right, to the enjoyment of which
another is entitled, or causes to such other some substantial
loss of money, health, or material comfort." (See also 24
Cal.Jur. 589.) [4] It is further established in this state
that by an unlawful and unauthorized labor practice an employer who is damaged thereby may recover damages in a t.ort
action. In James v. Marinship Corp.,25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d
329, 160 A.L.R. 900], it was said that the "object of con·
certed labor activity must be proper and that it must be
sought by lawful means, otherwise the persons injured ... may
obtain damages ... (Citations.)" (See also Park ct T. I.
Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d
599, 603 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].)
There is then the further question whether the objective of
the defendant unions was a proper and lawful one. Section
923 of the Labor Code, as enact.ed in 1933 (Stats. 1933, p.
1(78) and reenacted in 1937 (Stats. 1937, p. 208), provides
as follows: "In the interpretation and application of this
chapter, the public policy of this State is declared as follows:
Negotiations of terms and conditions of labor should result
from voluntary agreement between employer and employees .
. . . [I]t is necessary that the individual workman have full
freedom of association, self·organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such rcpTt'sentativt's or
in self·organization or in other concerted activities fOT the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-

)
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tection. " Section 1667 of the Civil Code, enacted in 1872,
provides: "That is not lawful which is: ... Contrary to the
policy of express law though not expressly prohibited. . . ."
[5a] In the present case the court found, in accordance with
the allegations of the complaint, that in order to achieve an
unlawful objective the defendants had made a demand on the
plaintiffs that they execute the contract and concluded that the
demand, if complied with, would constitute an unlawful interference with the bargaining rights of the plaintiffs' employees.
Such conduct on the part of the defendants was directly
contrary to the policy of the state as set forth in section 923
of the Labor Code above quoted. The trial court correctly
concluded from the evidence that by their demand the defendants sought to require the plaintiffs to interfere with the
bargaining rights of their employees and force upon them
terms and conditions of their employment and labor representation not of their own choosing and which in fact they
had rejected. If the plaintiffs had acceded to the demand
of the defendants a definite case of coercion on the part of
the plaintiffs with respect to the bargaining rights of their
employees, contrary to law, would have been accomplished.
After the decision of this court in McKay v. Retail Auto.
S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 Ca1.2d 311 [106 P.2d 373], the
Legislature in 1947 enacted the Jurisdictional Strike Act.
(Stats. 1947, pp. 2952-53.) That enactment is incorporated
in the Labor Code as sections 1115 to 1120 inclusive. Section
1118 defines a jurisdictional strike not only as a "concerted
refusal to perform work for an employer" but also as "any
other concerted interference with an employer's operation or
business, arising out of a controversy between two or more
labor organizations as to which of them has or should have
the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer
on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a
controversy between two or more labor organizations as to
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have
its members perform wo·rk for an employer." Section 1115
states that a jurisdictional strike" as herein defined is hereby
declared to be against the public policy of the State of Cali.
fornia and is hereby declared to be unlawful." Section 1116
provides that" any person injured or threatened with injury
by violation of any of the provisions hereof shall be entitled
to injunctive relief therrfrorn in a proper case and to recover .
any damages resulting therefrom in any court of competent
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jurisdiction. ". Section 1117 defines a "Labor organization
as IC any agency or employee representation committee or aD)'
local unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work. . .• As used herein, 'person'
means any person, association, organization, partnership, corporation, unincorporated association, or labor organization."
[6] In the present case it does not appear clearly whether
the plaintiffs' employees had or had not selected a' committee .
or unit or other agency for the purpose of collective bargain~'
mg. However, it does appear that they preferred to deal
directly with their employers pursuant to their individual
bargaining rights. If they had exercised their rights under
the law and chosen to deal with their employers through some
committee or organization they would have come directly
within the provisions of the Jurisdictional Strike Act.
['1] The foregoing provisions of the Labor Code, that is,
sections 923 and 1115 through 1118, are in pari materia in that
they relate to the same general subject and should be considered together. They all represent an endeavor on the part of
the Legislature to safeguard the rights of the individual workman and the employer in this important field of labor-management relationships.
The question of the constitutionality of the provisions of
the Jurisdictional Strike Act came before this court in Setleft
Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union (1953),40 Cal.2d 368 [254
P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327]. By the complaint the plaintUf
sought an injunction and damages for the alleged unlawful
conduct of the defendants. At the trial the defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. The objection was sustained and from a
judgment dismissing the action an appeaJ was taken. It was
contended by the defendant unions that the act was unconstitutional on the ground that under the guaranties of freedom
-Federal legislation to the same effect ill found in leetion 303(a)(4)
(19 U;B.C.A., t187fa)[4] of the Labor Management Relation. Act «(11
Stat. 158) prohibiting jurisdirtional .trikes, and .actioD S03(b) (29
U.B.C.A., .187[bJ) authorizes an aetion for damages for violation
thereof. A judgment for damages for violation of that provisioD waR
rendered by the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, a1Iirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (lntetflotionol 1,OfIg,hore·
.etl'6, eto. 17tl\(m v. JUtl6GU Spruce COTp., 189 F.2d 177), and a1Iirmed
b7 the Supreme Court in 1952 (Intcrnotio'IIQl l.ong8l1oremefl " eto. U.w.
Y. /fIIIIMIIj BfWVOf COflI., 342 U.B. 237 (72 B.Ct. 235, 116 L.Ed. 2711]).
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of speech "the picketing was lawful, and the act, therefore,
in condemning concerted interference with the employer's
business, is invalid, because it deprives them of the right to
engage in lawful concerted action, that is, peaceful picketing;
that such activity does not create a 'clear and present danger'
justifying a restraint on the freedoms mentioned."
By unanimous opinion of this court it was held that the
legislation under attack did not infringe upon the constitutional rights of free speech. There was no allegation in the
complaint that interstate commerce was involved. [8] It
was point.ed out. that. although "Peaceful picketing has been
identified with freedom of speech -a means by which the
pickets communicate to others the existence of a labor controversy," nevertheless the identification of peaceful picketing
with freedom of speech did "not free the concerted activity
of picketing from all restraint." (See also Northwestern Pac.
B. B. Co. v. Lumber ~ S. W. Union, 31 Cal.2d 441 [189
P.2d 277J.)
[5b] Based on the foregoing provisions of the statutory law
of this state and the finding and conclusion of the trial court,
which is amply supported by the evidence, that the only purpose of the defendants' activities was to compel the plaintiffs
to execute the proposed agreement, we are bound to conclude
that the conduct of the defendants constituted an unlawful
labor practice contrary to and in violation of the laws of this
state.
Apart from the question of the existence of an actionable
.tort based upon an unlawful labor practice under state law
is the question whether any limitation placed on peaceful
picketing constitutes an undue interference with personal
liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
After the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Guss case,
in the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case, and in this case, all
on March 25, 1957, the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. "fogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 [77 S.Ot.
1166, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347J (June 17, 1957) entered upon an
extensive review of its decisions involving peaceful picketing.
It was there said at page 1166: .. This is one more in the long
series of cases in which this Court has been required to
consider the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment
on the power of a State to enjoin picketing." After reviewing those cases the court stated at page 1171 : "This series of
cases, then, established a broad field in which a State, in
• C.Id-IIO
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enforcing some public po1i('y, whether of its criminal or its
civil law, and whrthrr anllounced by its legislature or it.s
courts, could constitutionall~' enjoin peaceful picketing aimed
at preventing effectuation of tl111t policy." Among those local
policies which the ('()llrt drl'll1l'd to be proper objectives for
state action was thnl which, 8H in the present case, made il
unlawful to coerce 1111 employer to put pressurr on his em,
ployees to join a pal'li('ular I1llioll, The courl commented on
Pappa.s v. Stacel/. };)] Me. 36 [116 A.2d 497], where it
appeared that unioll t'lllployrPR picketed a restaurant peace·
fully "for thr sole purpose of seeking to organize other em·
ployees of the Plaintiff. ultimately to have the Plaintiff enter
into collective barf!uilling and negotiations with the Union,
. . . " The Maine Snprrme .Tudicial Court had drawn an infer·
ence from an agrerd statement of facts that "there is a steady
and exacting pressurl' upon the employer to interfere with the
free choice of thf' t'lIlployees in the matter of organi7-ation.
To say that the pil'kl'ting is not designed to bring about such
action is to forget all obvious purpose of picketing-to cause
economic loss to till' business during noncompliance by the
employees with thr l't'quests of the union," The trial court
held the conduct to tlt' in violation of a Maine statute which
provided as follow~: "Workers shall have full freedom of
association, self org1mization and designation of representatives of their own rhl"lOSing for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and condition~ of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection, free fl'l.)m interference, restraint or coercion by
their employers or other persons.... " (P .L. 1941, ch. 292;
RS., ch. 30, § 15 (1!)~!') The United States Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal in the St8Cf'Y (,Jlse because it presented no
substantial federal «I1leStion, (Stacey v. Pappas, 350 U.S.
870 [76 S.Ct. 117, }(\) L.Ed. 7701.) The Vogt case presented
a similar problem ftlh:! v;hiIe thf' Supreme Court said that it
"might well have M::ied cF.Ttiorari on the strength of our l
decision" in the Stat"tY ea"e it ne\'ertheless "thought it advisable to grant certion--i , . , and to restate the principles governing this type of ('.I;5e."
In the Vogt case, a!- i!I tb .. Stacey case, the problem involved
pressurr brought to Na: Ile~inst an employer through peaceful,
picketing in an attf'illPt to ~rce him to influence his em-;
ployees to join a l~h~ arg-anization. The Supreme Court of.
Wisconsin had stat,,! ili- "On .. would be credulous indeed·
to believe under tht eirr:uns~ances that the Union had no· •
thought of coercin& the employer to interfere with its em-I,~
,:t;\}
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ployees in their right to join or refuse to join the defendant
Union." As in the Stacey ease the Wisconsin court held that
such picketing was for an unlawful purpose and in violation
of a Wisconsin statute which made it an unlawful labor
practice for an employee individually or in concert with other!!
to "coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfer!'
with any of his employes in the enjoymt'nt of their legal
rights ... or to engage in any practice with regard to hi!':
employes which would constitute an unfair labor practice
if undertaken by him on his own initiative." (Wis. Stat.,
§ 111.06 (2) (b).) In the Vogt case the Supreme Court, again
referring to the Stacey case said: "The Stacey case is thiR
case ... As in Stacey, the highest state court [of Wisconsin 1
drew the inference from the facts that the picketing was to
coerce the employer to put pressure on his employees to join
the union, in violation of the declared policy of the State.
(For a declaration of similar congressional policy, see § 8 of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140,29 U.S.O. § 158,29 U.S.O.A.
§ 158.) The eases discussed above all hold that, consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may enjoin such
conduct." (See also United Assn. of Plumbers etc. Union v.
Graham, 345 U.S. 192 [73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946] ; Building
Seroice etc. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 [70 8.Ct. 784.
94 L.Ed. 1045].)
The present case is the same in all essential respects as
the Stacey and Vogt cases, ~th the single exception that
in those cases interstate commerce was not involved and thus
the question of encroachment on the jurisdiction of the National LaboT Relations Board was not at issue. However,
those considerations which go to the existence of a cause of
action for tortious conduct in violation of the declared policy
of a state are the same. Not only are the declared policies
of Maine and Wisconsin identical in all material aspects ~th
the law of California, but the manner in which those laws were
violated and thus gave rise to 'an actionable tort cannot be
distinguished.
.
The United States Supreme Court, in its majority opinion
in the Vogt case, pointed out that there had thus been a
gradual transition from tht' premise that peaceful picketing
was an absolute right {see Tknrnht'll v. Alabama (1939), 310
U.S. 88 [60 8.0t. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]), and that it is now
universally recognized that thl're is something more in peaceful picketing than merely the communication of ideas or free
speech entitled ~thout qualification to Fil'St Amendment pro-
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teetion. (See Bake'1/ ct P. Driver, efo. Looal. v. WohZ, 815 '~
U.S. 769, 776-777 [62 8.0t. 816, 86 L.Ed. 11781.) The court
in the Vogt case noted that the cases in this field disclosed •• an'
evolving, not a static, course of decision," and that the doctrine of a particular case "is not allowed to end with its '
enunciation.... " It traced the evolution of the law in this
field from the Thornhill case which had been deemed to accord
to peaceful picketing unqualified First Amendment protection, to its present holding that the intervening cases "established a broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public ,
policy . . . could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing . .~
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy."
":
Mr. Justice Douglas in the dissenting opinion in the Vogt
case summarized the evolution of the court's decisions dealing
with the legal principles here involved since the Thornhill
case. In criticizing the majority opinion he said that "The .
Court has now come full circle"; that the "retreat began
when, in International Brotherhood of Teamster" C. W. ct"
H. Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470' [70 S.Ct. '173, 94 L.Ed. 995, .~,
13 A.L.R.2d 631], four members of the Court announced that "
all picketing could be prohibited if a state court decided that '
that picketing violated the State's public policy. The retreat
became a rout in Local Union No. 10, United .A880. J. P. ct 8.
v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 [73 8.0t. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946]. It was
only the 'purpose' of the picketing which was relevant. . .• '
Today, the Court signs a formal surrender ... State courts
and state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit
or suppress any particular picket line for any reason other
than a blanket policy against all picketing."
[9] The majority of the Supreme Oourt by its latest decisions has thus defined and clarified the limitations which a
state may constitutionally place upon peaceful picketing conducted in the asserted exercise of the right of free speech as
contemplated by the First and Fourteeenth Amendments.
That court has unequivocally held that there may be something more in peaceful picketing than free speech, depending
on the facts of the case, and that conduct in the exercise of
the asserted right is subject to regulation in accordance with
a valid state policy in cases where interstate commerce is not
involved.
In view of the development and recent clarification of the
law in this field we are requested to reconsider the case of
McKay v. Retail ~ttfo. 8. L. Union No. 1067, supra, 16 Ca1.2d
311. That case in legal contemplation is similar to the present
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ease but there was no showing there that the employer cor·
poration wa.c; engaged in interstate commerce and there was
no request for damages. It appeared, however, that the controversy was between two labor organizations as to which had
"or should have the exclusive right to have its members perform work for an employer." (Lab. Code, § 1118.) The
picketing was peaceful. The employer took no part in the
controversy. It could not, under the law, interfere. It was
caught in the middle and according to the admitted facts
"the continuance of the picket lines [had] the effect of elosing
down the company's plant, stopping all work therein and
destroying its said business."
The McKay ease was decided on Oetober 14, 1940. It was
held that the picketing without violence there engaged in
was entitled to protection under the federal constitutional
right of freedom of speech. This declaration was made notwithstanding the provisions of section 923 of the Labor Code,
adopted in 1938, declaring the policy of the state and above
quoted. That section was referred to in the majority opinion
but only as to its ineffectiveness as against the constitutional
rights of the defendants.
We deem it unnecessary to reconsider the McKay ease for
the reason that the result sought by the request has already
been accomplished, first, by the enactment by the Legislature
of the Jurisdictional Strike Act in 1947 making the activities
of the defendants in the McKay ease unlawful with redress
by way of injunctive relief and damages; secondly by the
decision of this court in the first Seven Up ease in 1958 (8e11en
Up etc. Co. v. Grocery etc. Union, supra, 40 Cal.2d 368) i
establishing the constitutionality of that act as valid state :
law, and finally by the Supreme Court of the United States .
in the Vogt case (International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Vogt, Inc. [June, 1957], supra, 77 S.Ct. 1166) in affirming
jurisdiction in the state court to enforce such a state policy
either by injunction or damages, or both, when interstate
commerce is not involved. The McKay case, on its facts, would
fall within the regulatory provisions of the Jurisdictional
Strike Act, later enacted. It was undisputed in that case
that the controversy was between two labor organizations.
The effect of later statutes and decisions on that ease may
well be left for further judicial consideration when the same
or similar facts are 'presented.
It would also serve no useful purpose to review the numerous
other decisions of this court cited by the parties and prior
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to the latest expressions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in clarifying the decisional and other law in this field
of labor-management relations, and in making clear the extent
of the power of the state courts to exercise jurisdiction in
proper cases, both in law and in equity. Those decisions have
bet'n superseded, in many respects, by later law both statutory
and decisional. To engage in the task of distinguishing and
discussing them now would be a work of supererogation.
Whether they are or are not consistent with present law may
also be more appropriately pointed out as questions with
reference thereto are presented.
[10] The defendants contend that the trial court was without jurisdiction to award damages in this case for the reason
that the amount of the damages alleged and awarded was less
than the amount necessary to confer superior court jurisdiction. The complaint alleged past damages in the sum of $750
and future damages in the sum of $150 a day in addition to
the loss of contracts. Irreparable injury was alleged. Both
injunctive relief and damages in the sum of $1,000 were
awarded. The court correctly assumed jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case as to both issues. The fact that equitable
relief is ultimately denied does not destroy the judgment as
to the award of damages even though the award was below
the jurisdictional amount otherwise necessary. In Siltlerman
v. Greenberg,12 Cal.2d 252, it was said at page 254 [83 P.2d
293]: "The allegations of the pleading and the relief sought
established the character of the action. The fact that it was
substantially of an equitable as well as of a legal nature
invested the superior court with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the entire cause, and that jurisdiction was not di·
vested by the subsequent denial of equitable relief. The
court of equity having once obtained jurisdicti()n, properly retained the case and decided the whole controversy between the
parties. For a complete discussion of this subject see Becker v.
Superior Court, supra {l51 Cal. 313 (90 P. 689)]; also
Cook v. WinkZepZeck, supra, [16 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 759, 763
(59 P.2d 463)] and cases there cited."
There is substantial evidence to support the amount of
damages awarded.
In summary, it is concluded that the injunctive relief sought
by the plaintiffs is not, under the facts of this case, within
the juriRdiction of the superior court to grant; that the policy
declared by the Legislature of the state concerning coercive
conduct between employer and employee as to whether the
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employee should or should not join a particular union is a
valid state policy and activities contrary thereto are unlawful; that such policy is in all essential respects the same as
that declared by the legislatures of Maine and Wisconsin and
held to be valid in the Stacey case (Stacey v. Pappas, supra,
350 U.S. 870) and the Vogt case (International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., supra, 77 S.Ct. 1166) respectively;
that, as in those cases, such policy is violated by bringing
pressure to bear against an employer to coerce his employees
to join or not to join a particular union; that the conduct
of the defendants in the present case was contrary to that
policy and for that reason unlawful and tortious; that the
plaintiffs were entitled to maintain this action for damages
resulting therefrom, and that the trial court had jurisdiction
to award such damages. These conclusions are deemed to be
consistent with the opinion and order of the Supreme Court in
remanding this proceeding.
The judgment, insofar as it awards injunctive relief, is
reversed. Insofar as it awards damages to the plaintiffs the
judgment is affirmed, with costs to neither party in the
present proceeding.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The United States Supreme Court remanded this case for
a determination of the question whether plaintiffs have a
cause of action under state law. The majority of this court
now state that it is apparent from the remand that restrictions
on the power of state courts to enjoin conduct that is an unfair
labor practice are not applicable to an action for damages,
and that if we did not have power to award damages, the
Supreme Court would no doubt have so declared rather than
remanded the case. The remand cannot bear such a construction. In its opinion, the Supreme Court specifically
states that it does not reach the question whether an award
of damages can be sustained under United ConstrucNon W orkers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct.
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025]. The court did not find it necessary to
decide this question since onr earlier opinion in the ease
did not stat.e whether plaint.iffs have a cau!>e of action under
state law. If no cause of action for damages exists nnder
state law, it is of course immaterial whether the policy of
the federal statute does or does not permit the enforcement
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of such a cause of action in the state courts. The Supreme
Court, pursuing its usual policy of judicial economy, declined
to answer a problem when an answer was not strictly compelled. Whatever we may think of the wisdom of this policy,
considering the burden it places on litigants and the lower
courts, it furnishes a complete explanation for the remand
in the present case. Except insofar as earlier decisions of
the Supreme Court provide guidance, the question is still
open whether a state court has jurisdiction to award damages
in the kind of case now before us.
Soon after Garner v. Teamsters etc. Union, 346 U.S. 485
[74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], the Supreme Court qualified
the broad rule of that case in United Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833,
98 L.Ed. 1025). There the defendants employed threats of
violence and an armed mob in an effort to compel the plaintiff to recognize them as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. The Supreme Court upheld state court
jurisdiction to award damages for the injury to the employer's business resulting from such conduct, in spite of
the assumption that it was also an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b) (1). (29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1).)
Language in the opinion suggested that jurisdiction to apply
state law was preserved because the plaintiff sought damages
rather than an injunction and that the case was distinguishable
from the Garner case because there state law attempted to
provide a preventive remedy paralleling the preventive remedy
available under federal law, whereas "here Congress has
neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the tradi.
tional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries
caused by tortious conduct." (347 U.S. at 663-664.) Some
state and federal cases have relied on this distinction in
holding that damages may be awarded under state law for
conduct markedly different from that in the Laburnum case.
(Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., [9th Cir.], 233
F.2d 62, 65-66, rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct.
699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709] [peaceful picketing constituting tort under Oregon law] ; Denver Bldg. &: Constr. Trades Council v.
Shore, 132 Colo. 187, 196-197 [287 P.2d 267] [peaceful picketing in violation of Colorado Labor Peace Act] ; Benjamin v.
Foidl, 379 Pa. 540 [109 A.2d 300] [common-law conspiracy
to deprive of employment] ; Dallas General Drivers v. Wamix,
Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.), '281 S.W.2d 738, 745-746, aff'd on other
[295 S.W.2d 873] {peaceful picketgrounds, - - Tex. -
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ing and secondary boycott in violation of Texas antitrust
and antimonopoly statutes] ; see International Soutld TechniCia?IS v. Superior Oourt, 141 Cal.App.2d 23, 29-32 [296 P.2d
395] ; New York, New Haven if Hartford R. R. v. Jenkins, 331
Mass. 720, 734-735 [122 N.E.2d 759], rev'd sub nom. Local
25, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, New
Haven if Hartford R. R., 350 U.S. 155 [76 8.Ct. 227, 100 L.Ed.
166] ; Selchow if Righter 00. v. Damino, 146 N.Y.S.2d 874,
876-877 [Sup.Ct.].)
Relying on this same analysis, other courts in actions by
employees against unions have refused to award damages
under state law on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board was empowered to give substantially the same
relief under federal law by a back pay order. (Born v. Laube,
214 F.2d 349, denying rehearing in 213 F.2d 407 [9th Cir.],
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 855 [75 8.Ct. 80, 99 L.Ed. 674] ; Sterling
v. Local 438, Liberty Assn. of Steam if Power Pipe Pitters,
207 Md. 132, 144-146 [113 A.2d 389], cert. denied, 350 U.S.
875 [76 S.Ct. 119, 100 L.Ed. 773], motion for leave to file
petition for writ of prohibition denied, 351 U.S. 917 [76 S.Ct.
708,100 L.Ed. 1450) ; Real v. Ourran, 285 App.Div. 552, 553555 [138 N.Y.S.2d 809] ; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union, 45 Wn.2d
453, 460-461 [275 P.2d 440), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 [75
S.Ct. 604, 99 L.Ed. 1249].)
Still other courts have held that damages may be given
under state law in cases involving violence, apparently singling
it out as the critical factor distinguishing the Laburnum case
from the Garner case. (International Longshoremen', etc.
Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple 00., 226 F.2d 875, 883 [9th
Cir.], em. denied, 351 U.S. 963 [100 L.Ed. 1483, 76 8.et.
1026] ; Iftternational Union, United Automobile Workers v.
Russell, 264 Ala. 456 [88 So.2d 175, 180-182], cert. granted,
352 U.S. 915 [77 S.Ct. 213, 1 L.Ed.2d 121] ; Tallman 00. v.
Latal, 365 Mo. 552 [248 S.W.2d 547, 550-553]; see International Union of Electrical etc. Workers v. Underwood Oorp.,
[2d Cir.1, 219 F.2d 100, loi n. 3; but see Benz v. Oompania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., [9th Cir.] , 233 F.2d 62, 66, rev'd on
other grounds, 353 U.S. 138 [77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709].)
Under this analysis the reasons justifying jurisdiction to award
damages would be substantially the same as those that justify
state injunctive relief in cases of violence. (See 54 Columb.L.
Rev. 1147, 1148.) It might seem self-evident, however, even in
the absence of the Laburnum case, that if local interest in keeping public order is sufficient to preserve injunctions. under
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state law, it is sufficient to preserve the less drastic remedy
of damages.
A third possible basis for distinction might be found in the
court's constant reiteration in its opinion that recovery is
grounded on a common-law, apparently as distinguished from
a statutory, tort. (See Friendly Society of Engravers v.
Calico Engraving Co., [4th Cir.], 238 F.2d 521, 524.) Why
this distinction is relevant to the state's right to grant relief
is not clear, unless it suggests a difference between state law,,"
of general application and laws aimed specifically at labor
relations. (See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela·
tions,67 Harv.L.Rev. 1297, 1321-1324.)
When the Laburnum case is read against the background
of the Garner case, it is clear that these factors are not them·
selves the ultimate tests of state court jurisdiction to apply
state law, but indications of whether or not there is a likeli·
hood of conflict between state and federal policy. The possi·
bility of conflict of policies, pointed up in the Garner case.
remains the principal consideration, whether damages or in·
junctive relief, violence or peaceful picketing, common-law
or statutory rights to recovery are involved.
Thus, if there is a conflict between state and federal sub·
stantive rules in terms of conduct condemned or protected.
state law must of course give way no matter what remedy it
provides. Likewise, even if state and federal laws have an
appearance of harmony, as applied by different tribunals they
may become inconsistent and federal policy indirectly
thwarted. This potential inconsistency was the consideration
that lay behind the Garner decision and prompted the state·
ment that, "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of
procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or con·
flicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive
law." (346 U.S. at 490-491.) The notion of "conflicting
remedies" is a shorthand way of pointing up this potential
conflict in the application of substantive policies. Conversely,
the conclusion that there is no "conflict of remedies" would
seem to indicate that the different substantive rules as applied
by different tribunals will not conflict in terms of conduC1
condemned or protected, and that once this absence of con·
flict is assured, federal law does not envisage its preventivi'
remedy as necessarily the only one available to an injured
party. (See 53 Mich.L.Rev. 602, 606·609.)
The Laburnum case illustrates this last situation. Therp
was no conflict between the federal and state substantive rules
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because the conduct was a tort under Virginia law and an
unfair labor practice under the federal statute. There could
be no conflict in the application of these rules because of the
violent nature of the conduct involved, an element whose
presence is underlined by the later description of the Labur·
num case in the Weber opinion. (348 U.S. at 477.) The
Supreme Court's decision in the present case, in stating that
"Laburnum sustained an award under state tort law for
violent conduct," whereas the present case involves a .. differ·
ent situation," further emphasizes the importance of violence
in Laburnum, and that the rule of that case cannot be automatically extended to aU awards of damages. The examples
drawn by the court in the Laburnum case from legislative
history to support the survival of state remedies all include
references to violence (347 U.S. at 668-669), and the court's
review was specifically restricted to the question of state jurisdiction •• in view of the type of conduct found by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia.... " (347 U.S. at 658.) The
type of conduct gave assurance that in no event would federal
policy be expounded by the board to condone that which the
state there condemned.
This assurance was strengthened by the fact that the state
,'-as enforcing a law of general application rather than one
aimed specifically at labor relations; from Virginia's point of
view it was irrelevant that the defendant.s were labor organizations. Although this consideration is evidently not decisive
(see Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479 [75
S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546]), its importance is made clear in the
last paragraph of the opinion where it is said that, "If
petitioners were unorganized privat.e persons, conductinll
t.hemselves as did petitioners here, Virginia would have hall
undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact
that petitioners are labor organizations ... provides no reason·
able basis for a different conclusion." (347 U.S. at 669.)
Finally, since the stat~ sought to compensate for a com·
pleted wrong rather than parallel the preventive remedy avail·
able through the board, the danger of conflict with federal
policy was further reduced. However. since damages are a
means of enforcing policy and controlling conduct, althouJ!h
somewhat less direct than an injun('tion, the form of fhl'
remedy alone would not seem to he the eon!!iileration detrr.
mining whether stat.e law may conflict with f('o('ral la,v.
It is readily apparent that the present case provides no such
assurance that there will not be conflict between state and
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federal laws as applied. Defendants engaged in peaceful
picketing, not threats and violence i their conduct was not of
a type that gives any assurance how the National Labor
Relations Board would view it under section 8 (b), or that the
board might not find it a protect~d activity under section 7.
Furthermore, if recovery were permitted under state law,
it would be based, not on law of general application, but on law
aimed specifically at labor relations.
Section 303(b) (29 U.S.C. § 187 (b», gives a right of action
for damages to any person injured by certain secondary boycott activities described in section 303(a). (29 U.S.C. § 187
(a).) Damages can be awarded under this section by any
court that has jurisdiction of the parties, without a prior
determination by the National Labor Relations Board that
there has been an unfair labor practice. (See International
Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237.
243·244 [72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275].) It could be argued
that these provisions show a congressional willingness to take
the risk of inconsistent application by different tribunals of
standards bearing on labor relations for the sake of compen·
sating injured persons. A state court awarding damages
under section 303, however, would interpret and apply federal
law, and its decision could be brought into harmony with board
determinations under section 8 (b), and federal court adjudications under section 303 on review by the United States Suo
preme Court. The danger of inconsistency would be consider.
ably less than when recovery is under state law.
Because of the danger of conflict in the application of state
law with the National Labor Relations Board's application
of the federal statute, the trial court was without jurisdiction
to issue an injunction. I am of the opinion that for the
same reason it was without jurisdiction to award damages.
Furthermore, even if the federal statute does not bar an
award of damages, plaintiffs have no cause of action under
the established law of this state. For almost 50 years it has
been settled that a closed or union shop is a proper objective
of concerted labor activity because reasonably related to union
welfare and the betterment of working conditions. This
problem has been exhaustively considered in numerous decisions of this court, and the balance of values found to
weigh in favor of judicial self·restraint in enjoining or
penalizing union activities reasonably calculated to achieve
these ends. Nevertheless, a majority of this court now in
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effect overrules these cases and abandons a policy whose
wisdom is as clear now as it was when first adopted.
As early as Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
(1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann.Cas. 1165,21 L.R.A.
N.S. 550] this court held that it was not unlawful for a
union to call a strike of employees and order a boycott to
bring pressure on an employer who retained a nonunion
worker, and thereby to enforce a closed shop. Exclusion of
competition from nonunion workers was held a proper objective of concerted labor activity, and the court was unanimous in considering a strike a proper method of attaining
thL; "nd.
McKay 7. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union, 16 Ca1.2d
311, 315-325 [106 P.2d 373], presented the precise question
in volved in the present case: " Is it lawful for a labor union
by peaceful picketing to attempt to induce an employer to
employ only persons who are members of the picketing union
when there is no strike and the employees of the picketed
employer are satisfied with their employment and do not
desire to join the union." (See dissenting opinion at 338.)
The court held that the objective was lawful and had a reasonable relation to the betterment of the conditions of labor,
thus reaffirming and extending the principle of the Parkinson
case. Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Ca1.2d 379,
383·388 [106 P.2d 403), decided at the same time as the
McKay case, made it clear that sections 920-923 of the Labor
Code do not restrict the right of labor to engage in concerted
activity to attain a closed shop. These sections were enacted
as a result of the efforts of organized labor, and their purpose
was to outlaw the yellow-dog contract, not the closed shop or
union activities to obtain a closed shop.
The reasons for permitting picketing to compel a closed
shop even when none of the employees belong to the picketing
union were articulated in C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market
Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414] : "The members of a labor organization may have a substantial interest
in the employment relations of an employer although none
of them is or ever has been employed by him. The reason
for this is that the employment relations of every employer
affect the working conditions and bargaining power of employees throughout the industry in which he competes. Hence,
where union and nonunion employees are engaged in a
similar occupation and their respective employers are engaged
in trade competition one with another, the efforts of the

)

622 GARMON

11.

SAN

DIEGO BLDG.

TRADES COUNCIL
.

)

"

union to extend its membership to the employments in which";
it has no foothold is not an unreasonable aim," The im· ;
portance of attaining substantial equality in the economic
struggle between unions and employers led to the conclusion
that picketing to enforce a closed shop should be permitted
notwithstanding possible injury to the employer or the nonunion worker.
Magill Brothers, Inc. v. Building Service Ernp, Intl. Union,
20 Ca1.2d 506, 508 [127 P.2d 542), and James v. Marinship
Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900],
restated the law as established by the earlier cases, and in,
Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R.
1426], it was declared once again, and without dissent, that
under state law, considered alone, concerted activity for a
closed shop is lawful even when undertaken by a union
representing none of the employees. In Charles H. Benton,
Inc. v. Painters Local Union No. 333, 45 Ca1.2d 677.681 [291
P.2d 13], a decision handed down at the same time as our
first decision in the present case, a majority of the court,
obviously with the concurrence of those who dissented on
other grounds, stated that, "independently of rights given
under the federal statutes, under California decisions an
employer may not obtain relief from economic pressure
asserted in an effort to compel him to sign a union shop
agreement. " This proposition was not questioned by the
majority in their earlier opinion in the present case.
From this review of the cases it is clear that, as to labor
disputes to which federal law is in no way applicable, picket.
ing to compel an employer to sign a closed shop agreement
is picketing for a lawful purpose even when none of the
employees are union members. Weare now told, however,
that these cases "have been superseded, in many respects
by later law both statutory and decisional," and that to
"engage in the task of distinguishing and discussing them
now would be a work of supererogation." It is true that
the McKay ease has been superseded on its precise facts by
the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115.1120), if
the employees' committee there resisting the union was not
.. financed in whole or 'in part, interfered with, dominated or
controlled by the employer.... " (Lab. Code, § 1117.) The
McKay case did not hold, however, as suggested by the majority opinion in the present case, that section 923 of the
Labor Code was ineffective as against the constitutional rights
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of the defendants. Detailed discussion of section 923 \Vaq
reserved by the majority. in the McKay case for treatment
in Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union,8upra, 16 Ca1.2d
379, decided at the same time, and as stated above, that case
squarely held, not that sections 920-923 of the Labor Code
were constitutionally ineffective, but that those "sections lay
no statutory restraints upon the workers' efforts to secure
a closed shop contract from an employer.... " (16 Ca1.2d at
388.) The court candidly recognized that the argument
supporting the present majority's interpretation of section
923 had been accepted by severa] state courts, hut it expressly concluded that such argument "is not in accordance
with the law of this state, as judicially declared for many
years, nor is it based upon a fair construction of sections
920 to 923 of the California Labor Code, considering their
history and purpose." (16 Cal.2d at 388.) Moreover, the
controlling effect of the Shafer case cannot be avoided by the
suggestion that perhaps the employees here involved had
selected a committee to represent them and that therefore
the Jurisdictional Strike Act is applicable. The pleadings
and findings are barren of any suggestion that plaintiffs are
seeking relief under the provisions of that act, and it may
confidently be assumed that if there were any factual basis
for such relief, plaintiffs would not have overlooked it. Accordingly, unless federal law has changed the rule of the
Shafer case when interstate commerce is involved, there is
no basis in state law for an award of damages in this case.
In Park ct Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 603-606, 614 [165 P.2d
891, 162 A.L.R. 1426], we grappled with the effect of ft'deral
law on state law in this area. At the time of that decision
the federal statute made it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to enter into a closed shop agreement with a union
that did not represent a majority of his employees. It was
not an unfair labor practice, how.ever, for a union to picket
or use other concerted activity' to comp('l an employer to
sign such an agreement. The federal statute as then drawn
embraced only employer unfair labor practices, and the
National Labor Relations Board had no jurisdiction to provide
a remedy for union con duet. We applied state law, but
incorporated federal law. We reasoned that since under
federal law it was unlawful for the employer to acquiesce
in the union's demand for a closed shop, the union's demand
and picketing in support of that demand were concerted

)

activities for an improper purpose. These activities were·
unlawful as a matter of state law because state law adopted
the federal characterization of the objective as improper.
Much has happened in the field of labor law since our
decision in the Park & Tilford case, especially in regard to
the relation between state and federal law. In the Park &
Tilford case we felt it necessary indirectly to enforce federal
law through our own rule prohibiting concerted activity for
an unlawful purpose, since there appeared to be no other
way to protect federal policy from union encroachment. Section 8(3) (now § 8(a) (3» of the federal act prohibited an
employer from signing a closed shop agreement with a union
that did not represent a majority of his employees, but the
board had no authority to proceed against a union bringing
pressure on an employer to do what the act prohibited. This
reason for our intervention in support of federal policy was
removed by the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act. That statute makes the union conduct itself an
unfair labor practice subject to board control: section 8(b) (2)
makes it an unfair labor practice to attempt to force an
employer to violate section 8(a) (3). Thus the board is now
fully able to assess the impact of union conduct on the federal
policy embodied in 8(a)(3), and to vindicate that policy by
proceeding directly against the union.
Furthermore, decisions of the United States Supreme Court
since the Park & Tilford case, notably Garne,. v. Teamste,.,
Union, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], and Weber
v. Anheuse,..Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [76 S.Ot. 480, 99 L.Ed.
546], have made it clear that the definition and vindication of
rights created by the federal act rest exclusively with the
National Labor Relations Board. .As Mr. Justice Carter i
pointed out in the earlier dissent in the present case, the :
board is an integral part of the federal law, and that law is
not intended to apply when the board is not present. (45
Ca1.2d at 668.) Congress has not created abstract rights to be
free from unfair labor practices; it has created rights whose
scope and nature depend on board definition. Federal policy
does not require vindication in state tribunals. On the con·
trary, it requires that they not conflict with board action by
attempting to enforce federal rights either directly, or in.
directly by purporting to incorporate them into state law.
Thus the very r~asons that preclude us from giving injunctive relief for the violation of federal rights indicate that,
aasuming we could give damages, we should not do 80 if we
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are intelligently to apply our own unlawful purpose doctrine.
In no meaningful sense is the purpose unlawful.
The object of defendants' conduct in the present case is
unlawful only if we look to federal law to characterize it as
such. From what has been said, it is clear that there is no
reason to do so. The policy establishing the lawfulness
of the purpose under state law is as valid now as it was when
this court decided the McKay, Shafer, and C. S. Smith cases.
They should not be overruled.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February
13, 1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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